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Republic, which we miss if we are focused on 
Plato’s general commitments, as opposed to the 
views he develops in specific dialogues.
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ABSTRACT
I examine Melissa Lane’s claim that antianarchia 
is an element of Plato’s political thought. Plato’s 
antianarchia, she claims, is his profound rejection 
of political anarchy and corresponding general 
commitment to the value of rulers and office-
holders. I argue that while Socrates is committed 
to antianarchia in the Republic and other dia-
logues, he is not committed to it in the Socratic 
dialogues. Where we might expect antianarchia 
in those dialogues we instead find Socrates 
simply committed to the value of being lawful and 
the value of being ruled by those with knowl-
edge. I suggest that we can think of the Socratic 
dialogues as having a distinctive place within the 
structure of Plato’s corpus without thinking that 
they were composed earlier in his life or that they 
served a specific pedagogical function. I end by 
suggesting that what is most interesting about 
Plato’s antianarchia is how he develops it in the 
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In this paper Melissa Lane defends in two-
parts the claim that we can interpret Plato’s 
political theory. First, she argues that it is pos-
sible to interpret any aspect of Plato’s thought 
at all. Then she argues that we can interpret his 
political thought, in particular, by defending 
the more specific claim that one central element 
of his political thought is ‘his profound rejec-
tion of political anarchy’ (p. 60), which she calls 
his antianarchia. She provides an insightful 
philological argument that anarchia involves 
not having rulers, rather than simply lacking 
laws, and so his antianarchia is his support for 
having rulers and office-holders. In these com-
ments I focus on how to think of antianarchia 
as an element of his political thought, and in 
doing so raise some methodological questions 
about how to read Plato’s dialogues.
Lane says that antianarchia ‘is asserted as 
a commitment of Plato’s political thought, by 
which I mean the political relationships among, 
and within, embodied individuals in an era 
devoid of direct divine rule’ (p. 63). At the same 
time, she acknowledges that antianarchia ap-
plies to the embodied soul as well as the polis, 
insofar as they have parallel structures (p. 63). 
In the Republic, anarchia is bad for the city and 
souls alike; in both, the different parts should 
follow a ruler. Antianarchia is, of course, mere-
ly one example of a norm in the Republic that 
applies to both the city and the soul. Justice is 
the most prominent example; instead of being 
a specifically psychic norm or a specifically 
political one, it applies at a broader level that 
encompasses both.
Does the generality of Plato’s antianarchia 
pose a problem for thinking that it is distinc-
tive of his political thought? I do not think 
so. Instead, let me suggest that this generality 
itself is a distinctive feature of Plato’s political 
thought. It is a distinctive thesis about politics 
to claim that some of its central norms are not 
unique to it, but are in fact more general. Of 
course, if Plato had no notion of politics, then 
he could not appreciate this as a distinctive 
thesis about it.1 But one of the main ideas in 
the Republic is that at least some of the same 
norms apply to the city and the soul. Thus, 
while antianarchia is not a commitment of 
Plato’s political theory per se, it is part of a 
distinctive position about politics: viewing at 
least some of its crucial norms as applying at 
a broader level. You might worry that having 
these broad norms downplays the importance 
of the polis. But there is no more reason to think 
this than there is to think that having such 
norms downplays the importance of the soul.
Lane’s claim is not simply about the Republic; 
she claims that antianarchia is a distinctive 
commitment of Plato’s political thought in 
general. On Lane’s methodological picture we 
should, following Sedley, view the dialogues 
as a sort of Plato thinking aloud, and at the 
same time, following Gerson, think that there 
are certain basic commitments and patterns of 
argument that Plato has throughout the dia-
logues (p. 61-63). For Lane, calling these ‘com-
mitments’ is compatible with thinking that 
they are high exploratory and non-dogmatic.2 
Nonetheless, she thinks that ‘however firm or 
conversely exploratory and open-ended were 
Plato’s positive intellectual commitments, there 
are certain patterns of argument that one would 
never find reason in reading the dialogues to 
attribute to him’ (p. 63). She thus thinks that 
we can define Plato’s general commitments as 
the denial of those things he argues against 
and never argues for. The question then, given 
this approach, is whether Plato is consistently 
against anarchia, or only in certain dialogues. 
In order to answer that question, it will 
be useful to know why Plato is committed to 
antianarchia. He certainly seems committed 
across the dialogues to the value of having one’s 
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actions guided by knowledge, and in particular 
to the value of being ruled by knowledge rather 
than ignorance. But this only supports rule by 
those who have knowledge; it does not provide 
a general reason to accept rule. The Republic 
does seem to provide reasons to accept rule in 
general. It seems that to the extent that things 
are ruled, they are harmonious and orderly, and 
this is good. The way that Lane puts this is that 
‘the goodness of order […] animate[s] the value 
of antianarchia’ (p. 63). This provides reason to 
view any rule as good, to the extent it imposes 
some order, not only rule by reason – although 
that would certainly be best. That some rule 
is better than none is clear in the criticism of 
democracy and tyranny that are found in book 
VIII. People are not ruled by knowledge in an 
oligarchy, but it is still better than the democ-
racy and tyranny, with their attendant anarchia.
Is Socrates committed to the value of order 
across the dialogues? In the Apology he reports 
that he was ordered to round up Leon of Sala-
mis, but refused on the grounds that doing so 
would be unjust and unholy (32c-d). This is, of 
course, compatible with a broad commitment 
to the value of order and rule, but Socrates’ fo-
cus is entirely on the overriding value of doing 
what is just, regardless of what the rulers say. 
In opposing the wishes of the democracy he 
says that ‘I thought I should run any risk on the 
side of law and justice rather than join you, for 
fear of prison or death, when you were engaged 
in an unjust course’ (trans. Grube in Cooper 
1997, 32b-c). He does say that it is wicked and 
shameful to disobey one’s superior, whether 
god or man (29b). But this comment forces us 
to ref lect on what it is for someone genuinely 
to be a superior, especially given Socrates’ re-
fusal to obey when ordered to round up Leon 
of Salamis. The natural Socratic suggestion is 
that a genuine superior is someone who has 
the relevant knowledge.3
The Crito is a trickier case. There Socrates 
faces a concrete decision, which is different 
from the project in Republic VIII. Nonethe-
less, he bases his decision on general princi-
ples, which are broadly in line with those in the 
Apology. Socrates’ emphasis, as in the Apology, 
is on the importance of law and justice, not 
rulers per se. Given Lane’s important point 
that anarchia is about rulers in particular, not 
lawlessness, it would be a mistake to think 
of the Crito as animated by antianarchia as 
opposed to antianomia. He says in both the 
Apology and Crito that if you follow someone 
with knowledge you will be helped and if you 
follow someone without, you will be harmed 
(25b, 47a-d). The only reason to do what a ruler 
or office-holder tells you to is either (1) this is 
required to be lawful and just, or (2) this person 
possess knowledge, and so will guide you well. 
If you follow a ruler who lacks knowledge, you 
do not do so because their rule itself is good for 
the city or your soul, but because to do other-
wise would be unjust and harmful to your soul.
To be clear, Socrates is not positively argu-
ing that we should embrace anarchia in the 
Apology. But it is too low of a bar to say that 
we should attribute to Plato any idea that he 
argues for in one dialogue and does not actively 
argue against in another. The entire focus in 
the Apology and Crito is on doing what is law-
ful, just, and guided by knowledge. There is no 
indication of an independent value to rule or 
order, and there are frequent claims that these 
other things should entirely guide one’s actions. 
By contrast, consider Plato’s antimaterialism, 
which Gerson takes to be a central element of 
Platonism. It is true that in many dialogues, 
e.g., the Laches, there are no antimaterialist 
claims, but nor are there claims where anti-
materialism would have been natural to dis-
cuss, given the context. The Laches is silent on 
materialism because it is simply not relevant, 
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whereas antianarchia would be relevant in the 
Apology and Crito and we are given different 
reasons and arguments instead.
Antianarchia seems to characterize Plato’s 
so-called middle and late period dialogues, 
rather than the Socratic dialogues.4 In the mid-
dle and late dialogues order and structure are 
valued, even if they are not guided by knowl-
edge.5 In the Socratic dialogues, rule is valued 
as long as it is rule by someone with knowledge, 
but the order and structure provided by non-
knowledgeable rule have no particular value. If 
this is correct, what should we make of it? On 
the unitarian side, we could simply say that in 
different dialogues Socrates pursues different 
interests and arguments. Perhaps in some dia-
logues there is no sign of antianarchia, but that 
does not mean he ever changed his mind. On the 
developmentalist side, we could say that Plato’s 
views evolved from his earlier, Socratic views to 
the middle period. We could then discuss how, if 
at all, Plato’s views change in the late dialogues.
Recently there has been weariness about the 
whole debate between unitarians and develop-
mentalists. But if we abandon these approaches, 
what should we replace them with? One tendency 
has been to simply focus on Plato’s views in par-
ticular dialogues. This can be quite productive, 
since within a given dialogue we can see the un-
folding of developed lines of reasoning for par-
ticular views, between a stable set of interlocutors. 
But it seems unnecessarily restrictive to avoid 
talking about views across the dialogues. Pat-
terns of reasoning in the Euthydemus and Meno 
or the Republic and Phaedrus, seem too closely 
connected to artificially refuse to draw on dia-
logues to tell a broader account; at the same time, 
the apparent differences between dialogues surely 
warrant consideration. The cross references Plato 
puts between the dialogues, both in the outer 
frames and within the discussions, suggest the 
he wants us to read them alongside each other.
One way to discuss the differences between 
dialogues without a developmentalist account is 
with a pedagogical one. The idea is, for example, 
that Plato intended readers to read a Socratic 
dialogue that asks a ‘what is it?’ question, like 
the Laches, before reading the Phaedo, and a dia-
logue that contrasts forms with sensible things, 
like the Phaedo, before reading the Parmenides. 
This is compatible with thinking that the Laches 
or Phaedo could have been written after the Par-
menides. However, while I think it is very plausi-
ble that Plato wanted to structure the dialogues 
in some such way, we do not need to rely on 
such a hypothesis to see an important structure 
in the dialogues. Regardless of the order that 
Plato wrote the dialogues or how he intended 
us to read them, there is a structure to the ideas, 
arguments, and interactions within them. Ideas 
are mentioned in one dialogue and developed in 
others, similar arguments are presented in dif-
ferent ways, interlocutors respond to Socrates in 
different ways, and, I would argue, ideas are ac-
cepted in some dialogues and rejected in others. 
There is a philosophically interesting story to tell 
about how forms are discussed in the Euthyphro, 
described differently and further developed in 
the Phaedo and Republic, and then discussed 
in a new way in the Sophist and Philebus. And 
there’s an interesting story about why and how 
it is important to be ruled, and the role of law, 
in the Apology and Crito, which is further de-
veloped in the Republic, and finally the States-
man and Laws. While it is nearly impossible 
to discuss these things without using temporal 
vocabulary, and suggesting that Plato did it for 
this purpose, we need not be committed to this. 
Tracing these intellectual lines is one of the most 
philosophically rewarding ways we can interact 
with Plato’s dialogues, and we can do this with-
out committing ourselves to the order in which 
he wrote the dialogues or to his intentions in 
writing them.
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If we take this approach, focusing on the 
web of ideas and arguments that connects 
the dialogues, is there something important 
to be gained from determining Plato’s com-
mitments in general, as opposed to his com-
mitments in particular dialogues, or how his 
commitments develop across dialogues? What 
do we gain from a general understanding of 
Plato’s political theory, where this is a theory 
compatible with what he says across the dia-
logues, not simply in certain ones? Perhaps 
such a theory provides us with the guiding 
undercurrent of Platonic thought: that wis-
dom is the key virtue, or that it is important to 
answer ‘what is it?’ questions, or that everyone 
seeks the good, or that our actions should be 
guided by knowledge. But it is not clear that 
this undercurrent is fundamental to Plato’s 
thought in any given dialogue, or it contains 
the most important ideas in the dialogues. 
Arguably the most interesting and exciting 
ideas in the Republic are the ones that are only 
found there, and denied elsewhere. Ideas that 
we attribute to Plato simpliciter will play an 
important role in our overall understanding 
of the corpus, but we should be careful not to 
over emphasize them.
With this methodological picture sketched, 
let me return to antianarchia and its role in the 
Republic. I want to suggest a slightly different 
picture than Lane’s. She claims that before Plato 
tyranny and anarchy were opposed, whereas 
Plato aligns them (p. 67). However, I do not 
think that that is suggested by the passage Lane 
quotes from Isocrates’ Panegyricus (4.39):
For, finding the Hellenes living with-
out laws and in scattered abodes 
(Παραλαβοῦσα γὰρ τοὺς Ἕλληνας 
ἀνόμως ζῶντας καὶ σποράδην οἰκοῦντας), 
some oppressed by tyrannies, others per-
ishing through anarchy (καὶ τοὺς μὲν 
ὑπὸ δυναστειῶν ὑβριζομένους τοὺς δὲ 
δι᾽  ἀναρχίαν ἀπολλυμένους) …. (trans. 
Norlin 1928)
Note that both those that are oppressed by 
tyrannies and those perishing through anar-
chy are living without laws (ἀνόμως ζῶντας), 
and so tyranny and anarchy are aligned here. 
In fact, Lane’s philological examination of 
anarchia helps us appreciate what Isocrates 
is saying. Anarchia is not simple lawlessness; 
it is the lack of a ruler or officeholder. Iso-
crates is here relying on the idea that there 
are two different ways people can live with-
out laws: they can do so because they lack a 
leader, or they can have a leader but one with 
no regard for law – a tyrant. Thus, it is not 
a Platonic innovation to align anarchy and 
tyranny; Isocrates, and quite possibly others, 
see them as both involving lawlessness. Is 
there anything innovative, then, about Plato’s 
connection between anarchy and tyranny in 
the Republic?
Let me suggest that the innovation is that 
the political anarchy of democracy leads to the 
psychic anarchy of the tyrant. The innovation 
is not only to see the same problem, anarchia, 
in the city and the soul, but to give a deeper 
account of what brings about tyranny, namely 
an underlying psychic condition of anarchia 
(574e-75a, 565d-66a), which is the result of 
living in the anarchia of a democratic city 
(562e-63e). Thus, what is distinctive about 
Plato’s alignment of anarchy and tyranny in 
the Republic is how it fits both into the city-
soul analogy and into the interaction between 
city and soul. And this, of course, is a distinc-
tive feature of the Republic, not found in other 
dialogues. There is a danger that in looking for 
a commitment that we can attribute to Plato 
simpliciter we miss what is most interesting 
about antianarchia in the Republic.6
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NOTES
1 By contrast, I take it that even though Plato has com-
mitments relevant to the philosophy of mind, he does not 
have a notion of the mind, and so could not be aware that 
his commitments are about this.
2 Lane suggests that the term ‘view’ can sound dogmatic 
(in the modern English sense of ‘dogmatic’, p. 61), and so 
instead she tends to talk about Plato’s ‘commitments’. To my 
ear, ‘commitment’ sounds more dogmatic than ‘view’, but in 
any event, the point is that we need not think of Socrates as 
dogmatically committed to these positions. 
3 Even if Socrates thinks it is wicked to disobey one’s 
conventional superior, this need not mean that obey-
ing them would be good for you. It may simply be that 
disobeying them is unjust and unlawful.
4 In most of the so-called Socratic dialogues Socrates 
does not mention the value of order and harmony – the 
notable exception being the Gorgias (503e-504d), which is 
frequently thought of as a transitional dialogue.
5 Although, if what is ultimately valuable is order 
and harmony, it might seem that this could be brought 
about with less of a role for rulers. Arguably, the Laws is 
engaged in precisely such a project.
6 I would like to thank Emily Fletcher and Richard 
Kraut for comments on an earlier draft of these com-
ments. 
